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Abstract
As at the start of 2018, at least eight low-lying Pacific islands have been found to have 
disappeared as a result of climate change induced rising sea levels and more seem 
likely in future to suffer the same fate. Because international law demands territory 
as a requirement of statehood, this could have implications for the affected states’ 
continuation and the livelihood of the populations displaced. Scholars in recent years 
have therefore pointed to various strategies for the disappearing island community to 
maintain a territorial dimension. This article examines in particular the as yet largely 
uninvestigated option of pursuing remedial territory, i.e. territory transferred from re-
sponsible to injured states as redress for climate change induced deterritorialisation. 
Applying the rules on state responsibility, it considers whether at least some emitting 
third states may be obliged to provide a portion of their territory as reparation for the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act.
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In May 2016, five of the Solomon Islands were found to have disappeared as a re-
sult of rising sea levels.1 By July 2017, further islands in Micronesia had suffered 
the same fate.2 These discoveries are thought to be the first, but by no means 
last, confirmation of the impact of climate change in the region. According to 
data published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc), a 
number of small low-lying islands located in both the South Pacific and Indian 
Oceans stand to be submerged in the next fifty to one hundred years.3 This 
situation raises a number of important questions from an international law 
perspective, including whether the affected island communities  – following 
the complete loss of their territorial basis – could cease to be states.
This is an important matter for a number of reasons. First, the possible phys-
ical disappearance of a sovereign state has never presented itself before. Any 
current consideration of so-called ‘state disappearance’ is within the context of 
state succession but these cases all presuppose that a successor state begins to 
exist on, or assumes control over, the territory of the previous state.4 Also, be-
cause international law accords primacy to states,5 with the loss of statehood 
comes the loss of a number of special privileges and attributes. For instance, 
only states have the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice (icj) and only states can create the primary sources of international 
law. States are also the only actors to benefit from sovereign immunity and 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and they are the only subjects 
of international law who can legitimately use force. Finally, the livelihood of 
entire populations will be placed at stake.
1 Simon Albert, Javier Leon, Alistair Grinham, John Church, Badin Gibbes and Colin Wood-
roffe, ‘Interactions between Sea Level Rise and Wave Exposure on Reef Island Dynamics in 
the Solomon Islands’, Environmental Research Letters, 11: 1–9 (2016).
2 Patrick Nunn, Augustine Kohler and Roselyn Kumar, ‘Identifying and Assessing Evidence 
for Recent Shoreline Change Attributable to Uncommonly Rapid Sea Level Rise in Pohnpei, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Northwest Pacific Ocean’, Journal of Coastal Conservation, 21: 
719–730 (2017).
3 The most recent assessment report (ar5) can be found online at http://www.ipcc.ch/, 
accessed 30 August 2018.
4 See James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 705–714.
5 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What is International Law For?’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.), Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 33–35; Gerry Simpson, ‘Something to 
Do with States’ in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Theory of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 566–570.
 3Climate Change and Disappearing | doi 10.1163/23527072-00101008
brill open law (2018) 1-23
<UN>
In this article, the likely implications of climate change inundation on the 
legal status of the affected small island communities are therefore considered 
alongside some of the possible strategies for territorial sovereignty to be re-
tained. The section following this introduction briefly outlines how the doc-
trine of statehood traditionally envisages the relationship between territory 
and sovereignty and the consequence of deterritorialisation on the continuity 
of the state. Following that, in the next section some of the main non-remedial 
strategies of territory retention are examined. These include the building of 
artificial islands, the appropriation of unclaimed land (terra nullius) and coop-
eration with third states. It is shown that, whilst theoretically available, these 
strategies are unlikely to succeed due to legal restrictions and practical limita-
tions. The final section thus turns to consider the as yet largely uninvestigated 
option of pursuing remedial territory, i.e. territory transferred from responsible 
to injured states as redress for climate change induced deterritorialisation. Ap-
plying the rules on state responsibility – as codified by the 2001 Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (arsiwa)6 – it 
is considered whether at least some emitting third states may be obliged to 
provide a portion of their territory as reparation for the commission of an in-
ternationally wrongful act.7
It is assumed as uncontroversial for the purposes of this article that some 
states have committed internationally wrongful acts – by failing to exert suf-
ficient regulatory control over emission activities within their jurisdiction so as 
to meet their international obligations8 – and that their responsibility might 
be engaged as a result. The discussion is thus focused on the consequences 
of responsibility, in particular in terms of suitable reparation, rather than the 
general conditions necessary for responsibility to arise. The article’s main ar-
gument is that, despite the presence of practical and juridical difficulties, the 
law as it currently stands does not prevent reparation in the form of remedial 
territory and in fact already provides for this form of redress in specific cir-
cumstances. It also contends that remedial territory presents the most suitable 
6 arsiwa, adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd Session, Official Records 
of the General Assembly, 56th Session, Supplement No. 10, un Doc. a/56/10, Chapter iv.e.1 
(2001).
7 Von Paepcke seems to be the only other scholar at present to have contemplated a possible 
claim to a new state territory, although without directly considering the rules of state re-
sponsibility in international law. See Frederik Von Paepcke, Statehood in Times of Climate 
Change: Impacts of Sea Level Rise on the Concept of States (Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 2014), 
pp. 159–192.
8 As provided by the conventional climate change regime and the customary no harm rule.
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form of reparation in international law, legally and normatively, given the un-
availability and inherent limitations of other types of redress.
 Territory, Sovereignty and the Law of Statehood
In line with Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
 Duties of States (Montevideo Convention),9 there is general consensus that 
the state as an international legal person should possess a defined territory, a 
permanent population, government and the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states.10 The problem for a disappearing island is that the dominant 
view among legal scholars is that the loss of any one of these constitutive ele-
ments will normally entail state extinction.11 More specifically for present pur-
poses, it is generally thought that extinction will occur where a state ceases to 
possess any viable territorial base. For Marek, for instance, ‘that a state would 
cease to exist if its territory were to disappear, e.g. an island which would be-
come submerged, can be taken for granted’.12 Likewise, for Craven, ‘where the 
territory of a state becomes submerged by the sea, it should be possible to con-
clude that the state has ceased to exist’.13 In the hope of avoiding this outcome, 
what follows therefore examines some of the different strategies available to 
the disappearing island community to find replacement territory and continue 
an existence in line with the traditional rules of statehood. There are of course 
also scholars, such as Burkett, who argue that the law is not so clear-cut and 
extinction of the international legal personality of a state following the loss of 
its material elements cannot be automatically inferred.14 However, the domi-
nant view remains that there can be no state without territory and this will 
therefore be the assumption here.
9 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 
1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) 165 lnts 19.
10 For further discussion of these requirements, see Crawford, The Creation of States in Inter-
national Law, pp. 37–96.
11 Ibid., p. 671.
12 Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (Paris: Librai-
rie Droz, 1968), p. 7.
13 Matthew Craven, ‘The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under 
International Law’, European Journal of International Law, 9: 142–162 (1998), p. 159. See also 
Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 151.
14 Maxine Burkett, ‘The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialised Nationhood 
and the Post-Climate Era’, Climate Law, 2: 345–372 (2011).
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 Non-Remedial Strategies to Find Replacement Territory
 Building Artificial Islands
One of the first solutions often envisaged for a disappearing small island state 
to continue its existence in line with the traditional rules of statehood is the 
construction of artificial territory such as artificial islands.15 There is no doubt 
that this is technically a possibility and, if achieved, it would have the advan-
tage of enabling the people to remain in their ancestral home base. The Mal-
dives, for instance, has already built the artificial island of Hulhumalé next to 
its capital Malé. Created by the dredging of sand from the ocean floor which 
has then been disgorged into a shallow lagoon, Hulhumalé encompasses over 
four hundred hectares of land which rise to a height of three metres above cur-
rent sea level. It houses a hospital, schools, government buildings, commercial 
zones and residential areas for a total population of over forty thousand as of 
2016.16
The problem is that this sort of construction endeavour is extremely expen-
sive and may thus in many cases turn out to be insurmountable.17 It is moreover 
not a solution that is guaranteed to last. Indeed, in light of the fact that even 
the multi-billion dollar World Islands in Dubai – an ambitiously constructed 
group of over three hundred man-made islands strategically positioned to 
form the shape of the countries of the globe – are sinking back into the sea 
from where they came,18 this may not be the most sustainable option. It is also 
important to be mindful of the potential for unwelcome environmental knock-
on effects. The creation of artificial islands stands to lead to serious marine 
environmental damage and the destruction of the marine ecosystem. In the 
2016 South China Sea Arbitration,19 for instance, the tribunal had no doubt in 
concluding that ‘China’s artificial island building activities have caused devas-
tating and long lasting damage to the marine environment’ in the South China 
Sea.20 While it is not necessarily suggested that the same level of harm would 
15 See, for instance, Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, Disappearing Island States in International 
Law (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2015), p. 169; Abhimanyu Jain, ‘The 21st Century Atlantis: 
The International Law of Statehood and Climate Change Induced Loss of Territory’, Stan-
ford Journal of International Law, 50: 1–52 (2014), p. 47.
16 For more information, see https://hdc.com.mv/hulhumale/, accessed 30 August 2018.
17 The cost of constructing Hulhumalé has run into hundreds of millions of dollars. See ibid.
18 See Richard Spencer, ‘The World is Sinking: Dubai Islands Falling into the Sea’, The Tele-
graph, 20 January 2011.
19 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (2016) pca Case No. 2013–19.
20 Ibid., para. 983. For more information generally, see paras. 976–983. See also Tim Stephens, 
‘The Collateral Damage from China’s Great Wall of Sand: The Environmental Dimensions 
of the South China Sea Case’, Australian Yearbook of International Law, 34: 41–52 (2016).
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come to be caused in the case of disappearing small island states which could 
(and likely would) take steps to minimise any negative environmental impacts, 
it is unlikely to be possible to limit the harm caused completely. The need to 
adapt to impending environmental damage cannot be used as an excuse to 
cause even more in its wake.
A further issue to be considered is whether an artificial island on its own 
could be relied upon to fulfil the requirement of a defined territory.21 For 
some scholars, such as Wong, this is very much contested under current inter-
national law.22 This is said to be evidenced by the 1978 decision of the Admin-
istrative Court of Cologne in Re Duchy of Sealand.23 In this case, it was held 
that a British Second World War platform attached to the seabed off the coast 
of the United Kingdom (uk) did not fulfil the requirement of territory since 
territory must ‘consist in a natural segment of the earth’s surface’ and ‘come 
into existence in a natural way’.24 However, it must be underlined that this case 
actually dealt with an artificial installation as opposed to an artificial island 
and, moreover, this was not the only reason for the Court’s refusal to recognise 
Sealand as a sovereign state. There was in addition the lack of a permanent 
population, the so-called nationals of the Principality not satisfying the crite-
ria for community life.25
Potentially more relevant was the 1972 attempt to create the Republic of Mi-
nerva by building up a reef on the high seas in the vicinity of Tonga.26 This was 
at least more in line with the kind of artificial island likely to be constructed by 
a disappearing small island state, i.e. an island created by building up existing 
21 This has been raised by several scholars. See, for instance, Catherine Blanchard, ‘Evolu-
tion or Revolution? Evaluating the Territorial State Based Regime of International Law in 
the Context of the Physical Disappearance of Territory Due to Climate Change and Sea 
Level Rise’, Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 53: 66–118 (2016), p. 94; Rosemary 
Rayfuse and Emily Crawford, ‘Climate Change, Sovereignty and Statehood’, Sydney Law 
School Research Paper No. 11/59, p. 7.
22 Derek Wong, ‘Sovereignty Sunk? The Position of Sinking States at International Law’, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 14: 346–391 (2013), p. 384.
23 Re Duchy of Sealand (Administrative Court of Cologne) (1978) 80 ilr 683.
24 Ibid., pp. 685–686. For more information generally about the Principality of Sealand, see 
https://www.sealandgov.org/, accessed 30 August 2018.
25 Ibid., p. 687. Only very rarely has the case been made for the sovereign recognition of 
Sealand. See, for instance, Andrew Lyon, ‘The Principality of Sealand and its Case for Sov-
ereign Recognition’, Emory International Law Review, 29: 637–671 (2015).
26 For more information, see Lawrence Horn, ‘To Be or Not To Be: The Republic of Minerva 
and Nation Founding by Individuals’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 12: 520–556 
(1973).
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territory so that it is permanently above water at high tide. Here again, admit-
tedly, the view seems to have been taken that only those parts of the surface of 
the earth which have come into existence in a natural way can be recognised 
as constituting state territory. As noted by Crawford, for instance, ‘artificial 
islands cannot form the basis for territorial states any more than can ships’.27 
While this point may seem (at first glance) rather obvious and self-evident, 
however, on closer examination it is not. A ship is a very different thing than 
an artificial island. It moves, crosses borders, is not physically attached to any 
place on earth and cannot sustain life. The opposite is true of (at least some 
forms of) artificial islands. They do not pose the same jurisdictional and practi-
cal issues, they do not move and can, in principle, sustain life.
Clearly, this argument should not be interpreted as opening the floodgates 
generally to the existence of states based on artificial islands. The creation and 
continuity of states are distinct legal phenomena and it is important to rec-
ognise and maintain this distinction between the two. While a restrictive un-
derstanding of the territory requirement as a precursor to statehood prevents 
uncontrolled state proliferation, and was thus perhaps correctly construed 
in the two aforementioned examples, it plays no such role with regard to the 
continuation of pre-existing states.28 In realising this argument in practice, 
Gagain suggests that steps could be taken to collectively recognise that inun-
dated states can continue to exist exclusively by means of artificial territory.29 
For instance, if a majority of states representative of the international com-
munity as a whole voted in favour of a United Nations (un) General Assembly 
resolution on the matter, their action could serve to highlight the presence of 
opinio juris which could ultimately help to accelerate the development of a 
new universal rule of customary international law.30
Key problems with this option nevertheless remain concerns about fund-
ing, sustainability and unwelcome knock-on environmental impacts. As such, 
27 See James Crawford, ‘Islands as Sovereign Nations’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 38: 277–298 (1989), p. 279.
28 Jain, ‘The 21st Century Atlantis’, pp. 26–27.
29 Michael Gagain, ‘Climate Change, Sea Level Rise and Artificial Islands: Saving the Mal-
dives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims through the Constitution of the Oceans’, Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 23: 77–120 (2012), pp. 114–115. See 
also generally Grigoris Tsaltas, Tilemachos Bourtzis and Gerasimos Rodotheatos, ‘Arti-
ficial Islands and Structures as a Means of Safeguarding State Sovereignty against Sea 
Level Rise: A Law of the Sea Perspective’, paper presented at the 6th ablos Conference, 
Monaco, October 2010.
30 Relevant guidance on this issue generally can be found in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v 
Libya (1978) 17 ilm 1.
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the construction of artificial islands cannot be relied upon for a definitive solu-
tion and other available options must also be explored.
 Appropriating Terra Nullius
The second strategy that is open to a disappearing small island state to con-
tinue its existence in line with the traditional statehood rules is the appropria-
tion of terra nullius.31 As noted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca) 
in the 1928 Island of Palmas Case,32 if unclaimed territory can be identified, 
an inchoate title may be completed by the effective occupation of the region 
found.33 According to the Permanent Court of International Justice (pcij) in 
the 1933 Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,34 the concept of 
effective occupation requires some actual exercise or display of sovereignty.35 
There are a wide range of acts that may constitute manifestations of this, usu-
ally classified according to the three traditional powers of a state, i.e. legisla-
tive, executive and judicial.36 The difficulty is identifying an area that is not 
currently under any state’s jurisdiction as today this is not widely thought to 
exist in international law.37 The only unclaimed areas remaining are those re-
garded as res communis but these – encompassing outer space, the high seas 
and Antarctica – are intended to serve as a common resource to be shared by 
all of humanity and therefore are not generally capable of being reduced to 
sovereign control.38 Moreover, the most viable area of res communis is Antarc-
tica and there is a cruelty inherent in relocating a community currently located 
on or near the equator to the coldest part of the world.39
 Cooperation with Third States
The remaining strategies available to a disappearing small island state to find 
replacement territory involve cooperation with third states. They include, on 
the one hand, merger with another state less threatened by rising sea levels 
31 Jain, ‘The 21st Century Atlantis’, p. 47.
32 Island of Palmas Case (United States v The Netherlands) (1928) 2 riaa 829.
33 Ibid., p. 846.
34 Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) (1933) pcij 
Rep Series A/B No.53.
35 Ibid., pp. 45–46.
36 For further discussion, see Marcelo Kohen and Mamadou Hébié, ‘Acquisition of Territory’, 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2011, para. 31.
37 Jain, ‘The 21st Century Atlantis’, p. 47. The only way land belonging to no one is likely to 
become available now is that created through a volcanic eruption.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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and, on the other hand, the formal cession by another state of a replacement 
territorial base. These options will now briefly be considered in turn.
 Merger
First of all, a disappearing island state could seek to merge with another state 
less threatened by rising sea levels.40 The main problem with this strategy is 
that, while it would address some of the problems associated with disappear-
ance, such as finding a new home for the displaced islanders, it would not 
address the problem of the loss of statehood and is therefore unlikely to be 
viewed from a small island state perspective in a favourable light.41
Third states have also shown no appetite to accept the total populations of 
disappearing island communities and, as stands, there is no requirement for a 
protection response under international refugee law – as codified by the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)42 and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol)43 – which is 
generally viewed as an inappropriate framework for helping the environmen-
tally displaced. Whereas Convention refugees, in line with Article 1(A)(2) Refu-
gee Convention, flee persecution by their own government – or actors their 
government is unable or unwilling to protect them from – for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social 
group, this is not the case of a person fleeing the effects of climate change. 
While, in an attempt to resolve this problem, scholars such as Docherty and 
Giannini have called for a new international treaty on climate change displace-
ment to create a new class of refugee-like protected persons,44 others, most 
notably McAdam, argue that it is premature to push for a new global standard 
40 This has been suggested by several scholars including Susin Park, ‘Climate Change and 
the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-Lying Island States’, unhcr Legal and Pro-
tection Policy Research Series, ppla/2011/04, p. 18; Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘W(h)ither Tuvalu? 
International Law and Disappearing States’, unsw Law Research Paper No.2009–9, p. 8; 
Lilian Yamamoto and Miguel Esteban, Atoll Island States and International Law: Climate 
Change Displacement and Sovereignty (Berlin: Springer Publishing, 2014), p. 199.
41 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, p. 701.
42 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into 
force 22 April 1954) 189 unts 137.
43 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into 
force 4 October 1967) 606 unts 267.
44 Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini, ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Con-
vention on Climate Change Refugees’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 33: 349–403 
(2009).
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setting agreement in this way.45 Apart from the clear unwillingness of states to 
develop such an instrument, it is contended that this kind of focus may distract 
from the distinct need for – and more feasible prospect of – new domestic and 
regional legislation to facilitate migration.46 In 2017, for instance, the newly 
elected New Zealand government announced plans to create a special refugee 
visa for Pacific island residents who are forced to migrate because of rising sea 
levels.47 While this should no doubt be applauded and marks a turnaround for 
New Zealand which made international headlines in 2015 when the Supreme 
Court rejected a Kiribati man’s claim for climate refugee status in Teitiota v 
Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment,48 the 
current proposal still only offers asylum to a limited number of individuals – 
there are plans to start with one hundred places annually.49 There is also the 
question of whether being classified as refugees is desirable for the inhabitants 
of disappearing small island states. Far from automatically providing interna-
tional protection, it is arguable that the use of the essentially negatively per-
ceived concepts pertaining to refugee and forced migration law serves only to 
conclusively disempower the persons being displaced.50
 Cession
The second and more appealing strategy from a disappearing small island state 
perspective is the formal cession of territory by a third state.51 This would allow 
statehood to persist because sovereignty over the ceded land would transfer in 
its entirety to the disappearing small island state which would then relocate 
45 See Jane McAdam, ‘Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement 
Treaty is Not the Answer’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 23: 2–27 (2011).
46 Ibid.
47 For more information, see Charles Anderson, ‘New Zealand Considers Creating Climate 
Change Refugee Visas’, The Guardian, 31 October 2017.
48 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] 
nzsc 107. Several other climate change refugee cases have similarly been rejected. For 
more detailed analysis, see Jane McAdam, ‘The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on 
Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’, Migration Studies, 3: 131–142 (2015).
49 See Nina Hall, ‘Six Things New Zealand’s New Government Needs To Do To Make Climate 
Refugee Visas Work’, The Conversation, 30 November 2017.
50 Ibid. It has been suggested that the New Zealand government could instead consider 
expanding the existing Pacific Access Scheme. See https://www.immigration.govt.nz/
new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/about-visa/pacific-access-category-resident-visa/, 
accessed 30 August 2018.
51 Again, this has been suggested by several scholars including Park, ‘Climate Change and 
the Risk of Statelessness’, p. 18; Rayfuse, ‘W(h)ither Tuvalu?’, p. 7; Yamamoto and Esteban, 
Atoll Island States and International Law, p. 187.
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its population (or parts thereof) to the new territorial location, continuing its 
existence in line with the traditional rules of international law. The question is 
again how likely this strategy is to be achieved. While states are in theory well 
within their rights to cede portions of their territory, the chances of them actu-
ally doing so are rather small. Because there are few, if any, significant benefits 
to be gained from giving away land, the motivation to do this is weak.52
As an alternative, the possibility of purchasing land from another state has 
sometimes been suggested. First formulated in 2008 by then President of the 
Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, the idea was taken up by then President of Kiri-
bati, Anote Tong, in 2014. Kiribati concluded the purchase of two thousand 
hectares of land in Fiji (although the two parties involved in this transaction 
were the state of Kiribati and the Church of England as opposed to the states of 
Kiribati and Fiji as such). While so far noted that the purpose of the purchase 
is to develop coastal agriculture and thus enhance food security for Kiribati’s 
people, the possibility that it may become a relocation site for the inhabitants 
of Kiribati has been openly discussed.53 As noted by Crawford, however, ‘the 
persistent analogy of territorial sovereignty to ownership of real property is 
misguided’.54 The private purchase of territory is fundamentally different from 
the sovereign acquisition of land. While the purchase of territory gives the 
purchasing state private ownership rights, i.e. the right to occupy and extract 
natural resources or erect buildings, it does not give public sovereignty rights, 
i.e. the right to exercise sovereign jurisdiction, which are retained by the selling 
state itself.55
In an attempt to resolve this matter, the remaining section will thus turn to 
consider whether a disappearing small island state may somehow be entitled 
to replacement sovereign territory under international law.
 The Concept of Remedial Territory
In recent years there has been increasing recognition of a limited right to terri-
tory for states that are facing loss as a result of environmental factors – limited 
52 Rayfuse, ‘W(h)ither Tuvalu?’, p. 8; Yamamoto and Esteban, Atoll Island States and Interna-
tional Law, p. 187.
53 For more information, see Laurence Caramel, ‘Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate 
Change, Kiribati Buys Land in Fiji’, The Guardian, 1 July 2014.
54 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, p. 717.
55 Alexandra Harrington, ‘Anomalies of Territory: Examining the Relationship between 
Territory, Sovereignty and Statehood’, PhD Thesis, McGill University, 2014, p. 137.
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because it is still generally accepted that the state that currently holds sover-
eignty over the territory in question must be willing to give it up.56 In seek-
ing here to remedy this absence of compulsion on the part of third states, as 
noted, discussion will be shifted to the option of pursuing remedial terri-
tory, i.e. territory transferred from responsible to injured states as redress for 
climate change induced deterritorialisation. Applying the rules on state re-
sponsibility – as codified by arsiwa – this section considers whether at least 
some emitting third states may be obliged to provide a portion of their terri-
tory as reparation for the commission of an internationally wrongful act. As 
mentioned, it is assumed as uncontroversial for the purposes of this article 
that some states have committed internationally wrongful acts – by failing 
to exert sufficient regulatory control over emission activities within their 
jurisdiction so as to meet their international obligations – and that their 
responsibility might be engaged as a result. The discussion is thus focused on 
the consequences of responsibility, in particular in terms of suitable repara-
tion, rather than the general conditions necessary for responsibility to arise.
There are two core consequences that flow as a matter of law from the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act. First, in accordance with arsiwa 
Article 30, the responsible state is obliged to cease the wrongful conduct – in 
this case to bring greenhouse gas emissions back in line with its international 
obligations57 – and second, in accordance with arsiwa Article 31, full repara-
tion must be made for any injury caused.58 A disappearing island state could 
therefore potentially demand reparation provided a few important issues are 
addressed.
56 Alexandra Harrington, ‘Is there a Right to Territory in International Law?’ in James Smith 
(ed.), Property and Sovereignty: Legal and Cultural Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2016).
57 The continued duty of the responsible state to perform the obligation breached is pro-
vided in arsiwa Article 29.
58 This principle was established by the pcij in the 1927 Case Concerning the Factory at 
Chorzów. See Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) 
(1927) pcij Rep Series A No.9, p. 21. While, during the drafting of arsiwa, some mem-
bers of the International Law Commission (ilc) raised concerns about the requirement 
to make ‘full’ reparation, it was ultimately decided not to include any term qualifying 
the expression and the original wording was retained. For further discussion, see James 
Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), pp. 481–485. See also Benoit Mayer, ‘Climate Change Reparations and the Law and 
Practice of State Responsibility’, Asian Journal of International Law, 7: 185–216 (2017) for a 
more recent (re)consideration of the matter.
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The first issue is whether reparation can be demanded before injury has 
been suffered. While injury is not strictly a condition for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act and the invocation of state responsibility (only if 
the relevant primary obligation requires injury will injury have to be shown be-
fore any issue of responsibility is raised) nor is it a condition for the obligation 
of cessation, it is a requirement under arsiwa Article 31. No notion of ‘legal 
injury’, i.e. injury arising from the mere fact of the breach of an international 
legal norm, is included within the Article 31 concept of injury.59 This means 
that, until such time as inundation occurs, which in most instances has yet to 
happen, reparation may not be claimed as the injury has yet to be suffered for 
which it is due. In some instances, admittedly, inundation has already occurred 
and, as noted in the introduction, several low-lying islands have now started to 
disappear. However, this currently remains the exception rather than the rule.
Having said this, there is no convincing reason why the judicial protection 
of an endangered state should be narrowed down to a scenario where its ter-
ritory has already been lost. As discussed, such a country clearly cannot wait 
until the anticipated injury occurs because by then it will cease to exist and 
thus lose the capacity to make a claim under international law. From the per-
spective of scholars such as Von Paepcke, this leads to the conclusion that the 
claim of a disappearing island has to exist as soon as its future submergence 
can be demonstrated as a matter of scientific fact.60 On the basis of the most 
recent evidence available, it is arguable that a compelling case can already be 
made in this regard.61
A further issue relates to the causal link between the internationally wrong-
ful act and the prospective injury. According to Voigt, the causal analysis can 
usefully be broken down into several component parts.62 First, general causa-
tion refers to a link between an activity and the general outcome. Since the first 
report of the ipcc in 1990, there has been almost uniform scientific consensus 
that increasing greenhouse gas emissions have led to an increase in average 
temperature which has led to sea level rise which will in all probability lead to 
59 For further discussion, see Brigitte Stern, ‘A Plea for Reconstruction of International Re-
sponsibility Based on the Notion of Legal Injury’ in Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.), International 
Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2005).
60 Von Paepcke, Statehood in Times of Climate Change, p. 171.
61 See ipcc ar5.
62 Christina Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages’, Nordic Journal of In-
ternational Law, 77: 1–22 (2008), p. 15. See also Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage 
and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 
2005), p. 257.
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disappeared small island states.63 While it is difficult to ascertain when a piece 
of evidence would be accepted by an international court or tribunal as meet-
ing the required standard of proof to establish causation, there is no evidence 
that full proof would be necessary and certainty ranges like those employed 
would likely suffice.64 This will not therefore be the subject of further discus-
sion here. Focus will instead be placed on the second matter of specific causa-
tion, i.e. proving that a specific activity has caused a specific resulting harm.
According to the ‘but for’ test, the most widely used test under the current 
law,65 a defendant will be liable only if the claimant’s damage would not have 
occurred but for what he or she has done. The main problem with this test is 
that it cannot cope well in all situations and may sometimes lead to absurd 
results. In the context of climate change inundation, for example, but for the 
emissions of any single state, the territories of many small island states would 
still likely be submerged. This seems to suggest that, due to manifold causes, it 
is impossible to ascertain liability for this specific climate change harm.66 In an 
attempt to resolve this problem, scholars in recent years have started to con-
sider alternative approaches for establishing causation in multiple responsibil-
ity claims. According to Plakokefalos, the most convincing alternative is the 
so-called ‘necessary element of a sufficient set’ (ness) test.67 This test posits 
that, while each emitting state can truthfully say that its individual emissions 
were not independently sufficient to cause the resulting harm, they were all 
necessary elements of an overall set that were.68 Assuming concerns as to the 
extent of reparation that may be pursued from any one opponent can also be 
63 See ipcc ar5 as the most recent report.
64 For further discussion, see Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, 
pp. 260–263; Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages’, p. 16.
65 This has been noted by several scholars including Ilias Plakokefalos, ‘Causation in the 
Law of State Responsibility and the Problem of Overdetermination: In Search of Clarity’, 
European Journal of International Law, 26: 471–492 (2015), p. 477; Verheyen, Climate 
Change Damage and International Law, p. 253; Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for Climate 
Change Damages’, p. 15; Von Paepcke, Statehood in Times of Climate Change, p. 81.
66 Ibid.
67 Plakokefalos, ‘Causation in the Law of State Responsibility and the Problem of Overdeter-
mination’, p. 477.
68 Ibid. Similar approaches have likewise been propounded by Verheyen, Voigt and Von 
Paepcke. See Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, p. 257; Voigt, 
‘State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages’, p. 16; Von Paepcke, Statehood in Times 
of Climate Change, p. 82.
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overcome using the principles of shared responsibility,69 it may therefore be 
said that the presence of multiple causes does not pose a hurdle that cannot 
be overcome.
The next consideration is whether reparation encompasses territory. 
arsiwa Article 34 sets out the forms of reparation which, separately or in 
combination, will discharge the obligation to make full reparation for the 
 injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. These are restitution, com-
pensation and satisfaction. The likely suitability of each of these will now be 
 considered in turn.
In terms of whether restitution, the first of the forms of reparation available 
under arsiwa Article 35, encompasses the provision of a new state territory, 
it is not clear that this is so. Traditionally understood, restitution involves the 
re-establishment as far as possible of the status quo ante, that is, the situation 
which existed prior to the commission of the internationally wrongful act. 
In its simplest form, it thus involves such conduct as the release of persons 
wrongfully detained or the return of property wrongly seized.70 In the context 
of climate change inundation, unfortunately, this cannot be achieved. The tide 
cannot, as it were, be reversed. And even if it could, submerged land would 
likely have become entirely uninhabitable due to land contamination by salted 
seawater and the destruction of all existing ecosystems.
In many ways, this is more akin to a situation where restitution is excluded 
because it is materially impossible in line with arsiwa Article 35(a). While 
there are few cases in international courts and tribunals, according to the 
arsiwa commentary, relevant examples include those where property to be 
returned or restored has been permanently lost or destroyed.71 It could poten-
tially be argued, based on the non-traditional circumstances at hand, that ex-
ception be made and alternative territory be considered appropriate in terms 
of restitution. Indeed, to quote Von Paepcke, ‘the granting of a new state terri-
tory is the most appropriate legal consequence to establish not the status quo 
69 This involves the victim pursuing full reparation from any responsible state which can 
then in turn require reimbursement from the other states that have also contributed to 
the resulting harm. See Pierre d’Argent, ‘Reparation, Cessation, Assurances and Guaran-
tees of Non-Repetition’ in André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds.), Principles of 
Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). See also André Nollkaemper, ‘Shared Responsibility in 
International Law’, un Audiovisual Library of International Law, January 2016.
70 arsiwa Commentary, adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd Ses-
sion, Official Records of the General Assembly, 56th Session, Supplement No.10, un Doc. 
A/56/10, Chapter iv.e.2 (2001), Article 35, para. 1.
71 Ibid., Article 35, para. 8.
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ante but the closest scenario thereto’.72 The question is how likely this argu-
ment is to be successful or whether, as is the contention of this article, there 
are other, better, strategies that could be pursued.
The second form of reparation available is compensation for the damage 
caused. According to arsiwa Article 36 and the related arsiwa commentary, 
this generally consists of a monetary payment and may therefore again ap-
pear not to be relevant to the case at hand.73 Indeed, the commentary gives 
a large number of examples of situations in which compensation has been 
paid across a wide range of disputes, including environmental damage.74 This 
was added to further in the 2018 Case Concerning Certain Activities carried out 
by Nicaragua in the Border Area75 in which the icj for the first time issued an 
order on monetary compensation for environmental damage in respect of un-
lawful activities carried out by Nicaragua in Costa Rican territory since 2010. 
In at least some instances, however, international law does also seem to recog-
nise the possibility of compensation in non-monetary form. There is a notion 
in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(undrip),76 for example, of replacement territory for confiscated land that 
cannot be returned. Specifically, it is provided in Article 28 that:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include 
restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensa-
tion, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, 
taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed 
consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, com-
pensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in 
 quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other ap-
propriate redress.
72 Von Paepcke, Statehood in Times of Climate Change, p. 169.
73 See arsiwa Commentary, Article 36, para. 4.
74 Ibid., Article 36, paras. 13–15.
75 Case Concerning Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica 
v Nicaragua) (Compensation owed by Nicaragua to Costa Rica) (2018) available online 
at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/150/150-20180202-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf, accessed 
30 August 2018.
76 undrip, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/295, un Doc. A/res/61/295, 
2 October 2007.
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The notion of replacement territory has also sometimes been referred to in 
the case law. In the 2010 Endorois case,77 for instance, the Kenyan government 
evicted the Endorois people, a traditional pastoralist community, from their 
homes at Lake Bogoria in central Kenya to make way for tourist facilities and 
a national reserve. The African Commission on Peoples’ and Human Rights 
ruled that the Endorois’ eviction from their traditional land violated their hu-
man rights and called on Kenya to provide the Endorois with restitution of 
their lands or other lands of equal extension and quality as redress.78
The key point then is that there already exists both a recent international 
instrument and international case law which recognise the concept of reme-
dial territory as an appropriate form of reparation. What is being suggested for 
the disappearing small island community is not something completely novel, 
but already existing and accepted in international law. Remedial territory is 
chosen as an appropriate form of reparation when restitution is unavailable 
and when compensation will not suffice.
In the context of indigenous peoples, the reason that monetary compensa-
tion is usually inappropriate to ensure effective redress is that, because of the 
significance of their territory to them, in the absence of restitution, no amount 
of money can restore the often profound sense of collective spiritual identity 
and cultural wellbeing that has otherwise been dismantled – only the provi-
sion of a replacement territorial base can begin to repair the order by at least 
enabling it to continue its existence in the usual way.79 For the community 
of disappearing small island states, in the absence of restitution, no amount 
of money will make up for the ensuing loss of statehood. There is no money 
which can make up for the loss of what is essentially an immaterial legal status 
(though the loss of this immaterial status obviously has deep material conse-
quences for the people involved). In addition, it can also be said that, in some 
parts of the Pacific region, land is vitally important and for many cultures is 
77 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International 
on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, 276/2003, African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 4 February 2010.
78 See ibid., para. 209.
79 For further discussion, see Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Committee Report’ in International Law Association, Report of the 
74th Conference held in The Hague, August 2010, pp. 39–43. This was a specialised group 
of experts appointed by the International Law Association (ila) and tasked with pro-
viding authoritative clarification, elucidation and guidance in respect of the undrip 
provisions. See also Federico Lenzerini, ‘Reparations, Restitution and Redress’ in Jessie 
Hohmann and Marc Weller (eds.), The un Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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inseparable from those to whom it belongs. For the Marshallese, for example, 
the land possesses a sacred or spiritual quality and is at the very root of their 
existence in the world.80 The situation caused by climate change will thus also 
result in considerable loss of spirituality and culture. It is by no means sug-
gested that being vitally important and culturally significant is as strong as the 
link of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories (though at least some 
of the members of the displaced communities may be considered as indig-
enous peoples). The argument made here is by analogy – the primary reason 
for the granting of territory will be the loss of statehood, but it is also useful to 
be mindful of the value of the land to the populations involved.
Admittedly, there are still a number of problems that need to be resolved 
in order to make territorial compensation practically viable. One substantial 
matter is that, should an already inhabited area of land be granted as compen-
sation, it is important to consider the implications of transferring a populated 
piece of territory to a drowning state. To best protect the rights of the origi-
nal inhabitants, Dietrich and Wündisch propose two alternative solutions. On 
the one hand, they may choose to resettle on the downscaled territory of their 
original state. In this case, they would be entitled to full financial compensa-
tion for all associated costs. On the other hand, they could decide not to leave 
their current place of residence but would then have to accept the authority 
of a foreign state. In this case, the cession of territory has to be subject to the 
condition that the new authority credibly commits itself to respect the rights 
of the original inhabitants and they may also have to be granted citizenship 
after a certain amount of time.81
For those that choose the first option, i.e. decide to resettle, the reason that 
financial compensation is here justifiable when it was not above is that, while 
the political units of disappearing island communities lose all of their terri-
tory and hence their statehood which money cannot adequately compen-
sate, this is not the case of the political units in the areas where the drowning 
island states are to be re-established. They lose only part of their territories and 
not their state such that financial compensation is here adequate to provide 
redress. It is also already accepted that the right to housing has certain excep-
tions, i.e. it is not an absolute right, and that there are certain circumstances 
in which the state has the right to displace people. Indeed, while in its  General 
80 For more information generally on the meaning of land in Pacific islands, see John Camp-
bell, ‘Climate Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Impor-
tance of Land’ in Jane McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010), pp. 60–64.
81 Frank Dietrich and Joachim Wündisch, ‘Territory Lost: Climate Change and the Violation 
of Self-Determination Rights’, Moral Philosophy and Politics, 2: 83–105 (2015), pp. 100–101.
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Comment No. 4, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(cescr) considered that instances of forced eviction are prima facie incom-
patible with the right to adequate housing provided in Article 11(1) of the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (icescr),82 it 
was conceded that they could be justified in the most exceptional circumstanc-
es and in accordance with the relevant principles of international law.83 These 
conditions are likely to be satisfied in the specific context discussed here.84
In accordance with arsiwa Article 37, satisfaction is the third and final 
form of reparation available. It is not a standard form of reparation, however, 
in the sense that in many cases the injury caused by an internationally wrong-
ful act of a state may, by means of restitution and/or compensation, already 
have been fully repaired. Indeed, the rather exceptional character of the rem-
edy of satisfaction, and its relationship to the principle of full reparation, are 
emphasised by the phrase ‘insofar as the injury cannot be made good by res-
titution or compensation’ in arsiwa Article 37(1). In that this is likely to be 
the situation in the case in question, this will not therefore be the subject of 
further discussion here.85
As a final matter, account needs to very briefly be taken of the contribu-
tion to the injury by the injured state. This issue is regulated by arsiwa  
Article 39 which provides that, where the claimant has contributed to the re-
sulting harm, this may affect the extent of the reparation due. The key point to 
note is that a contribution is only relevant if it is ‘wilful’ or ‘negligent’, i.e. shows 
a manifest lack of due care. While it is true that most disappearing island states 
have also emitted greenhouse gases to some extent, they are believed to have 
jointly contributed on average less than one percent of the current greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere so it is unlikely this requirement would be deemed to 
be fulfilled.86
 Conclusion
This article has considered the plight of the community of disappearing small 
island states and the fact that, under existing law, without territory they may 
82 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 De-
cember 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 unts 3.
83 See cescr, General Comment No.4, un Doc. E/1992/23, 13 December 1991, para. 18.
84 For further discussion, see cescr, General Comment No.7, un Doc. E/1998/22, 20 May 
1997. See also Dietrich and Wündisch, ‘Territory Lost’, pp. 101–102.
85 For further discussion, see Crawford, State Responsibility, pp. 527–531.
86 See ipcc ar5.
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be said to have ceased to exist. In the hope of avoiding this outcome, some of 
the different strategies that could be employed to find replacement territory 
and thus continue an existence in line with the traditional rules of statehood 
have been discussed. It has been shown that, while none of the non-remedial 
strategies available are likely to provide a definitive solution, there is scope for 
a claim to remedial territory under international law.
The main question outstanding is whether it is possible for such a claim to 
be effectively implemented. Perhaps the most difficult matter is that of juris-
diction and the availability of a suitable forum for a liability claim. As things 
stand, the possibility that a court or tribunal considers a state responsibility 
claim is somewhat limited by the dependency in international law on sover-
eign states’ readiness (in accordance with the fundamental principle of state 
sovereignty) to submit their behaviour to scrutiny. They are able to decide for 
themselves whether or not they consent to a given court’s rule and, as noted 
by several scholars, most defendant states are unlikely to agree to be tried.87 
Admittedly, seventy three states (including several large emitters) have made 
declarations under Article 36(2) icj Statute88 recognising as compulsory with-
out special agreement the jurisdiction of the icj.89 This could prove useful for 
those disappearing island states that, in line with the principle of reciprocity, 
have likewise made Article 36(2) declarations. While currently quite limited 
in number, there is nothing to stop other affected communities in the future 
from taking similar steps. The main difficulty, should they do this, is the fact 
that states are free to append to their declarations any type of reservations. 
Even to the extent the declarations made to date are not a bar to jurisdiction, 
therefore, it is widely recognised that they can and often will be amended and 
even withdrawn entirely to prevent litigation before a case has commenced 
and there has been a long history of this practice taking place.90
87 Laura Horn, ‘Is Litigation an Effective Weapon for Pacific Island Nations in the War 
against Climate Change?’, Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, 12: 169–202 (2009), 
p. 197; Rebecca Jacobs, ‘Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat 
to Sue the United States in the International Court of Justice’, Pacific Rim Law and Policy 
Journal, 14: 103–128 (2005), p. 115; Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages’, 
p. 21; Von Paepcke, Statehood in Times of Climate Change, p. 179.
88 Annexed to the Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 
24 October 1945) 1 unts xvi (un Charter).
89 For a complete list, see http://www.icj-cij.org/en/, accessed 30 August 2018.
90 See, perhaps most notably, the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissi-
bility of the Application) [1984] icj Rep 392. For further consideration of the impacts 
of this case on later optional clause practice, see Brian McGarry, ‘Nicaragua’s Impacts 
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Following the 2016 Cases Concerning Obligations Concerning Negotiations 
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament,91 
it is likewise important not to take for granted the willingness of internation-
al courts and tribunals such as the icj to pronounce on politically charged 
questions, let alone ‘super wicked’ problems such as climate change. Here, the 
contention by the Marshall Islands that the three respondent states – India, 
Pakistan and the uk – had breached their disarmament obligations never ulti-
mately came to be decided on the ground that, as at the date of the respective 
applications, there existed ‘no dispute’.92 While, admittedly, caution is war-
ranted before jumping to conclusions and there are potentially a wide range of 
factors that might explain a judge’s vote or reasoning in any given case, these 
considerations alone are unlikely to eradicate concerns that the majority sim-
ply found new technical arguments to avoid dealing with a matter that they 
had absolutely no desire to entertain.93
A better option may therefore be to consider an alternative forum that could 
address the crisis and ensure remedies to disappearing small island states.94 
For instance, it could be that the concept of remedial territory becomes a 
part of the loss and damage mechanism that is now included in  Article 8 of 
on Optional Clause Practice’ in Edgardo Sobenes Obregon and Benjamin Samson (eds.), 
Nicaragua Before the International Court of Justice: Impacts on International Law (Berlin: 
Springer Publishing, 2017).
91 Case Concerning Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nucle-
ar Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India) (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) [2016] icj Rep 255; Case Concerning Obligations Concerning Negotiations 
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall 
Islands v Pakistan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2016] icj Rep 552; Case Concerning 
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to 
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v United Kingdom) (Jurisdiction and Admissibil-
ity) [2016] icj Rep 833.
92 For further consideration generally of the arguments made by the majority, see ibid. See 
also the separate opinions of President Abraham and Judges Bhandari, Donoghue, Gaja, 
Owada and Xue.
93 See, for instance, Michael Becker, ‘The Dispute That Wasn’t There: Judgments in the Nu-
clear Disarmament Cases at the International Court of Justice’, Cambridge International 
Law Journal, 6: 4–26 (2017), pp. 20–21; Andrea Bianchi, ‘Choice and (the Awareness of) its 
Consequences: The icj’s Structural Bias Strikes Again in the Marshall Islands Case’, ajil 
Unbound, 111: 81–87 (2017); Nico Krisch, ‘Capitulation in The Hague: The Marshall Islands 
Cases’, ejil: Talk!, 10 October 2016.
94 Pratheek Reddy, ‘Sinking Small Island Nations: Calls for a Lifeboat’, Environmental Law 
Reporter, 47: 10576–10579 (2017), p. 10578.
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the  Paris Agreement.95 The question is how to create the necessary political 
pressure and third party guidance required to reinvigorate this mechanism. 
As stands, any notion of liability and compensation has been explicitly ruled 
out.96 Seeking an icj advisory opinion on state responsibility for climate 
change impacts could potentially promote international efforts to come to an 
agreement.97 Indeed, like the campaign initiated in 2011 by the Pacific island 
state of Palau that, pursuant to Article 96 un Charter, the un General Assem-
bly request an advisory opinion from the icj concerning the duties of states to 
ensure that greenhouse gas emissions from their territory do not harm other 
states, there may be benefit in renewed efforts to invite the icj to advise on the 
legal responsibility of the largest emitters for climate change.98 In the event 
a request is made, admittedly, should the icj still then choose to deny it or 
adopt a restrictive approach on the matter, a ruling may be in danger of reduc-
ing the pressure on states. Again, as seen from the aforementioned discussion 
of the recent Marshall Islands claims, this is not entirely unimaginable. How-
ever, the general perception seems to be that the icj would be more willing to 
provide an advisory opinion than to decide a contentious case.99
In the interim, nevertheless, alongside remedial strategies to find replace-
ment territory, it is necessary to consider the possibility that statehood 
might now exist (or at least that some states might continue) in other, more 
95 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016).
96 See the Decision of the Conference of the Parties accompanying the Paris Agreement, 
para. 51, available online at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf, 
accessed 30 August 2018.
97 See Article 65 icj Statute. Scholars to have advocated the value of an advisory opinion 
in advancing the climate change cause include Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Role of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in Addressing Climate Change: Some Preliminary Reflections’, 
Arizona State Law Journal, 49: 1–24 (2017); Philippe Sands, ‘Climate Change and the Rule 
of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International Law’, Journal of Environmental Law, 28: 
19–35 (2016). For further consideration generally of the applicability of state responsibil-
ity despite practical obstacles precluding its implementation, see Benoit Mayer, ‘State Re-
sponsibility and Climate Change Governance: A Light through the Storm’, Chinese Journal 
of International Law, 13: 539–575 (2014).
98 For more information on the Palau initiative, see Douglas Kysar, ‘Climate Change and 
the International Court of Justice’, Yale Law School Research Paper No.315. This was ul-
timately left dormant because of threats of reprisal by large emitters. While the fear of 
retaliation has the potential to stymie future efforts as well, as seen, pressing for this could 
now prove imperative.
99 This is even so in the context of the Marshall Islands cases. See Daniel Joyner, ‘My Re-
action to the Dismissal of the Marshall Islands Cases by the icj’, Arms Control Law, 
5 October 2016.
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 non-traditional and non-territorial forms. As mentioned, there are already 
scholars who argue that extinction of the international legal personality of a 
state following the loss of its material elements cannot be automatically in-
ferred. Burkett, perhaps most notably, has argued that island states could sur-
vive as ‘nations ex-situ’.100 This would allow for their continued existence in 
perpetuity despite their populations eventually being spread across the globe. 
There can be no doubt that this kind of creative (re)interpretation of existing 
legal doctrine is worth pursuing further.101 The inability of the international 
legal order to prevent blameless victims from suffering significantly negative 
consequences raises persistent questions about the effectiveness and legitima-
cy of the system as it currently stands. Only by accepting that an island state 
threatened with the disappearance of its territory may continue to exist in a 
deterritorialised form can, and should, its international legal personality be 
preserved in spite of a rising tide.
100 Burkett, ‘The Nation Ex-Situ’.
101 This will in fact be the focus of some of the author’s own forthcoming work.
